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SHOULD WE TAX THE GRATUITOUS 
TRANSFER OF WEALTH?  
AN INTRODUCTION 
JAMES R. REPETTI* 
Abstract: The estate tax was enacted because of concerns about the impact of 
large concentrations of dynastic wealth on the political process. As discussed in 
this commentary, which reviews the Symposium articles by Paul Caron, David 
Joulfaian, and Jennifer Bird-Pollan, recent research by political scientists sup-
ports the legitimacy of these concerns. In addition, a significant body of studies 
suggests that inequality has a long-term negative impact on growth. Paul Caron 
observes in his article that progressivity in our tax system has been decreasing 
and that the estate tax was 60% or higher for fifty years (1934–1983), a rate 
much higher than the current 40%. David Joulfaian notes that the estate tax clear-
ly contributes to the progressivity of our tax system. He finds that estate tax lia-
bility of a decedent is on average equivalent to doubling the income tax liability 
of decedents during the prior ten years. Jennifer Bird-Pollan explores the views 
on estate tax from a liberal, utilitarian, and libertarian philosophical perspective. 
This commentary notes some additional aspects of the estate tax that strengthen 
the utilitarian and liberal arguments in favor of the estate tax. 
The role of the estate tax in our system has become increasingly contro-
versial. The first panel in this Symposium addresses some of the important 
issues pertaining to whether it is desirable to tax gratuitous transfers of wealth. 
The estate and gift tax was adopted for two principal reasons. First, it was 
viewed as a source of revenue. The estate tax accounted for about 1% to 1.5% 
of federal government revenues during the period 1981 through 2000.1 In 
2000, estate and gift tax revenues totaled $29.7 billion, accounting for 1.4% of 
revenues collected that year.2 In recent years, however, the role of the estate 
tax as a revenue source has decreased as a result of large increases in exemp-
tion amounts. Revenues from the estate and gift tax fell to $20,154,935 in 
2014, and accounted for only 0.65% of collected revenues.3  
It is interesting to note that had the share of revenues contributed by the 
estate tax remained at its 2000 level of 1.4%, the estate and gift tax would have 
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 1 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2014, at 15 & tbl.6 
(2015) (providing gross tax collections for fiscal years 1960–2014). 
 2 See id. 
 3 See id. 
816 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:815 
generated twice as much revenue in 2014: $42.9 billion.4 President Obama’s 
proposal to increase the estate and gift tax rate to 45% and reduce the estate tax 
and gift tax exemptions to $3.5 million and $1 million, respectively, in 2016 
would increase revenues by over $226 billion during the period 2017 through 
2026.5 
The second principal reason for the adoption of the estate tax was to curb 
dynastic wealth. President Theodore Roosevelt proposed an estate tax in 1906 
to prevent “the owner of one of these enormous fortunes to hand more than [a] 
certain amount to any one individual.”6 One major concern about dynastic 
wealth was its impact on democracy. In 1916, the economist Irving Fisher fa-
vored the adoption of an estate tax to help curb the “danger of an hereditary 
plutocracy” to “democratic ideals.”7 In 1935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
proposed expanding transfer taxes because he felt that large accumulations of 
wealth “amount to the perpetuation of great and undesirable concentration of 
control in a relatively few individuals over the employment and welfare of 
many, many others.”8 
Not surprisingly, modern studies confirm that there is reason to worry 
about the harmful effect concentrations of wealth have on the democratic pro-
cess. Studies show that large contributors have increased access to elected offi-
cials,9 and that policy outcomes of the U.S. federal government are more re-
sponsive to high-income voters where opinions of the wealthy and poor di-
verge.10 The result is that wealth tends to skew the political process. A recent 
study by two Princeton University political scientists concluded, “When a ma-
jority of citizens disagree with economic elites . . . they generally lose.”11 
Against this background, the three articles in this Symposium panel, 
which focuses on whether it is desirable to tax the gratuitous transfer of 
wealth, make significant contributions to the state of knowledge about the es-
                                                                                                                           
 4 This number is the product of multiplying Total Internal Revenue collections in 2014 of 
$3,064,301,358,000 by 1.4%. See id. 
 5 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL 
YEAR 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS 269 (2016). 
 6 RONALD CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH AND SOCIETY 60 (1982) (quoting an April 14, 1906 
speech given by President Theodore Roosevelt at the House of Representatives Office Site). 
 7 Irving Fisher, Some Impending National Problems, 24 J. POL. ECON. 694, 711 (1916). 
 8 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress (June 19, 1935), in H.R. REP. NO. 74-1681, at 2 
(1935), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 642, 643. 
 9 For a survey of studies, see James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 825, 845–46 (2001) [hereinafter Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth]. 
 10 See MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL 
POWER IN AMERICA 77–85 (2012); Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 
PUB. OPINION Q. 778, 788–89 (2005). 
 11 Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest 
Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 576 (2014). 
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tate tax.12 In his article The One-Hundredth Anniversary of the Federal Estate 
Tax: It’s Time to Renew Our Vows, Paul Caron reviews the data about increases 
in inequality.13 He notes that the share of wealth held by the top 0.1% rose 
from 7.1% in 1978 to 22.0% in 2012—a level almost as high as the 24.8% held 
by that group in 1929.14 
One may reasonably ask why we should worry about increased inequali-
ty. The short answer is that inequality is associated with significant adverse 
social consequences. As has been chronicled extensively elsewhere, inequality 
appears to be associated with significant societal ills and reduced economic 
growth.15 In the book The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies 
Stronger, for example, Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett argue that a variety 
of health and social outcomes (life expectancy, math and literacy, infant mor-
tality, homicides, imprisonment, teenage births, level of trust, obesity, mental 
illness, drug and alcohol addiction, and social mobility) are worse in countries 
with greater income inequality.16 This is illustrated in their chart, which is re-
produced below:17 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Why Tax Wealth Transfers?, 57 B.C. L. REV. 859 (2016); Paul L. 
Caron, The One-Hundredth Anniversary of the Federal Estate Tax: It’s Time to Renew Our Vows, 57 
B.C. L. REV. 823 (2016); David Joulfaian, What Do We Know About the Behavioral Effects of the 
Estate Tax?, 57 B.C. L. REV. 843 (2016). 
 13 See Caron, supra note 12, at 831. 
 14 See id. at 837–38. 
 15 See, e.g., RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUAL-
ITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER (2009) (extensively analyzing how inequality is linked with greater 
social problems). For surveys of this literature, see Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax 
Code: Using the Estate Tax to Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255, 
1260–73 (2013) [hereinafter Caron & Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code]; James R. Repetti, Democracy 
and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1150–51 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity]; Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, supra note 9, at 
836–49. 
 16 See generally WILKINSON & PICKETT, supra note 15 (detailing the causal relationship between 
income inequality and these issues). 
 17 Id. at 20. 
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Note that countries with high levels of inequality also have high levels of 
health and social problems. Similarly, studies that examine the long-term im-
pact of inequality on economic growth have uniformly found that inequality 
hurts long-term growth. The most recent survey of studies examining the rela-
tionship of inequality to economic growth observed that all of the long-term 
studies involving fifteen years or more found that inequality at the start of the 
period correlated with poor economic growth.18 
Caron notes that Emmanuel Saez and Thomas Piketty attribute the re-
markable increases in inequality, at least in part, to the reduced progressivity 
of the income tax and estate tax since 1960.19 Observing that the current estate 
tax is essentially a flat tax, Caron suggests that we need to restore progressivity 
to the rate schedule. He notes that at one time the top rate of the estate tax was 
seventy-seven percent applied to estates over $150 million in inflation-adjusted 
terms.20 Indeed, as Caron remarks, the top rate was sixty percent or higher for 
fifty years (1934–1983).21 
David Joulfaian adds the perspective of an economist to the discussion in 
his article, What Do We Know About the Behavioral Effects of the Estate 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Caron & Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code, supra note 15, at 1266–68 (surveying the studies). 
 19 See Caron, supra note 12, at 835 n.50. 
 20 See id. at 841. 
 21 See id. at 841 n.82. 
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Tax?22 It is sometimes asserted that the estate tax does not contribute to the 
progressivity of the U.S. system because it can be easily avoided. Joulfaian 
seeks to explore this issue by comparing the level of a decedent’s estate tax 
liability to her income tax liability in the year preceding her year of death.23 He 
finds that, on average, the estate tax liability of a decedent is twenty-six times 
greater than the income tax liability in the year preceding death.24 But Joulfai-
an notes that this statistic may be misleading because income tax liability in 
the year preceding a taxpayer’s death may not be representative of the income 
tax burden faced by the taxpayer over her life cycle. As a result, he also com-
pares the estate tax liability of a decedent to her income during the ten years 
preceding the year of her death.25 He finds that the estate tax liability is 2.2 
times the aggregate income tax paid by the decedent during the prior ten 
years.26 He states, “In other words, the estate tax is equivalent to doubling the 
income tax liability over the ten years preceding death.”27 These findings 
clearly suggest that the estate tax is contributing to the overall progressivity of 
our tax system. 
One of the most controversial aspects of the estate tax is whether it im-
pacts savings by decedents. Theory cannot predict the manner in which tax-
payers will respond to the estate tax because the response depends upon the 
motives for savings, as well as whether the income effect or substitution effect 
will dominate. Joulfaian surveys the studies that have found that the estate tax 
reduces the value of reported estates by about ten percent.28 But, as Joulfaian 
observes, it is impossible to determine whether this represents an actual de-
crease in savings by taxpayers during their lives in response to the estate tax, 
or instead is “window dressing” attributable to tax planning to reduce values 
reported in the gross estate.29 In addition, any actual decline in savings by tax-
payers subject to the estate tax may be offset by an increase in savings by heirs 
whose inheritance is reduced by the estate tax. Economists have suggested that 
as a result of this potential offset, there may in fact be “a tendency for estate 
taxes to increase saving, not decrease it.”30 
Joulfaian also summarizes empirical studies about the impact of the estate 
tax on charitable contributions. The empirical studies strongly suggest that the 
estate tax correlates positively with charitable contributions. The studies sur-
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Joulfaian, supra note 12, at 843. 
 23 See id. at 846–47. 
 24 Id. at 847. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See id. at 850. 
 29 See id. 
 30 See DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30600, ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXES: ECONOMIC ISSUES 9 (2009). 
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veyed by Joulfaian indicate that repeal of the estate tax would reduce charita-
ble bequests by approximately 20% and lifetime contributions by about 12%.31 
Jennifer Bird-Pollan addresses the philosophical arguments for and 
against the estate tax in her article, Why Tax Wealth Transfers?: A Philosophi-
cal Analysis.32 She notes that liberalism favors a progressive tax system be-
cause it helps establish an equality of opportunity championed by philosopher 
John Rawls.33 Rawls asserted that, “[E]ach citizen, regardless of class or 
origin, should have the same chance of attaining a favored social position, giv-
en the same talents and willingness to try.”34 Bird-Pollan notes that Rawls 
would not challenge inequality that is the result of different efforts by taxpay-
ers. But Bird-Pollan argues that Rawls would challenge inequality that is then 
passed onto heirs who did not earn that disparate wealth.35 
One may wonder whether there is any harm to opportunity arising from 
the transfer of this disparate wealth from one generation to the next. As dis-
cussed earlier, one of the major harms arising from inequality is that it skews 
the political process because wealth exercises a disproportionate influence.36 
Dynastic wealth magnifies this problem: it permits multiple generations of an 
affluent family to use the political system to perpetuate their economic and 
social position in a way that may create social rigidity and stifle opportunities 
for others.37 
Bird-Pollan also argues that utilitarianism favors a progressive tax sys-
tem. She points out that utilitarians seek to maximize happiness, and that phi-
losopher John Stuart Mill describes “higher” and “lower” pleasures.38 The 
“higher” pleasures, Bird-Pollan notes, are those that tend toward equality and 
justice, and are promoted by progressivity.39  
It is important to add that the “higher” pleasure that Mill associated with 
equality may result from equality’s important concrete contributions to social 
welfare. By increasing equality, the estate tax may be viewed as a Pigouvian 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See Joulfaian, supra note 12, at 855–56. 
 32 See Bird-Pollan, supra note 12, at 859. 
 33 See id. at 871. See generally Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 469 (2007) (applying this concept to the estate tax); Repetti, Democracy and Oppor-
tunity, supra note 15 (applying this concept to the income tax). 
 34 JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES WITH “THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED” 115 
(1999); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 73–75 (1971) (advocating for equality of op-
portunity). 
 35 See Bird-Pollan, supra note 12, at 873. 
 36 See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text. 
 37 See Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, supra note 9, at 849–50. 
 38 See Bird-Pollan, supra note 12, at 878. 
 39 See id. at 878–79. 
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tax40 in that it is helping to correct harmful externalities created by inequality. 
Thus, a tax system that reduces the harmful effects of inequality and dynastic 
wealth on the political process improves social welfare if one values democra-
cy.41 In addition, a tax that contributes to equality in society may enhance so-
cial welfare by contributing to higher productivity in that society. As discussed 
earlier, studies have found a significant correlation between inequality and 
poor long-term growth.42 
Lastly, Bird-Pollan suggests that some libertarians may favor estate taxa-
tion if it can be tied into the benefits conferred by the government on the tax-
payer. This, of course, is difficult because of differing views about the appro-
priate method to value benefits conferred by the government. One might argue 
that significant wealth is at least in part attributable to the benefits of a gov-
ernment, but it is hard to tease out the role of government from the individual 
efforts of the taxpayer. As Miranda Perry Fleischer has discussed,43 at least one 
libertarian would favor the establishment of a minimal safety net so that per-
sons in dire need would not harm the property rights of others by stealing.44 
The establishment of a safety net, however, does not require a progressive tax 
system. It can be created from revenues collected from a non-progressive tax. 
As a result, it is difficult to build a libertarian case for the estate tax. 
In conclusion, these articles and others in this Symposium play an im-
portant part in the continuing debate about the role of the estate tax in our sys-
tem. They explore major issues about the impact of the estate and gift tax on 
economic efficiency and distributive justice. Like fine wine, they will be sa-
vored for a long time. 
                                                                                                                           
 40 A Pigouvian tax, named after the British economist Arthur C. Pigou, is a tax that is assessed to 
correct an externality or market inefficiency. See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 84 (9th ed. 
2010).  
 41 See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text (discussing the social and political harms of con-
centrated wealth). 
 42 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 43 See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Libertarianism and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 56 B.C. L. REV. 
1345, 1372–74 (2015) (examining Eric Mack’s argument that property owners’ rights would be 
strengthened by providing this peremptory safety net). 
 44 See Eric Mack, Non-Absolute Rights and Libertarian Taxation, 23 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 109, 
109, 140–41 (2006) (“[S]uch a system would absolutize property rights, that is, it would remove the 
conditions that trigger dispensations from the obligation to respect those rights.”). 
  
 
 
